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On 1 January 1971 the International Investment Bank (IIB)
opened its doors in Moscow. The new bank was an organ of the Soviet bloc’s
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON), the or-
ganization responsible for multilateral economic interactions among Com-
munist countries. Within six months, this hybrid of state socialism and capi-
talist ªnance had loaned $13 million in hard currency and a total of 43.59
million transferable rubles (the nonconvertible currency unit used within the
Soviet bloc) to ªve industry and infrastructure projects in Hungary and Po-
land. By the end of the IIB’s ªrst year, its operations had expanded to sixteen
projects in ªve Soviet-bloc countries, totaling 181 million transferable rubles,
including $50 million in hard currency.1 The IIB grew steadily in subsequent
years, expanding its borrowing from Western money markets and its portfolio
of loans to borrowers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
The IIB was set up as one of an array of new institutions designed to pro-
mote economic integration among the CMEA countries while at the same
time helping them to modernize their economies. Offering loans in transfer-
able rubles and hard currency, the bank ªnanced investment projects
throughout the Soviet bloc. Approval of loans supposedly came after rigorous
and competitive vetting of investment proposals, and the use of credits was
supposed to be stringently audited. Despite these innovations, deliberately
modeled on capitalist institutions and mechanisms, the IIB failed in its overall
mission to invigorate the stagnating economies of the Soviet bloc. The reasons
for its failure, intimately tied to the rigidities of the Soviet command econ-
1. V. Shapovalov and V. Karpich to M. A. Lesechko, “On the 3rd Session of the Board of the IIB,” 30
July 1971, in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki (RGAE), Fond (F.) 302, Opis’ (Op.) 2,
Delo (D.) 897, Listy (Ll.) 5–8; and V. Shapovalov and V. Karpich, “On the Draft Directive to Mem-
bers of the Board of the IIB from the USSR to the 5th Session of the Board,” 10 April 1972, in RGAE,
F. 302, Op. 2, D. 999, Ll. 1–3. Although most of the CMEA materials at the Russian State Archive of
the Economy are not generally accessible to researchers, the archive’s Fond 302 (materials of the Soviet
representative to the CMEA) are available and are the main archival sources for this article.
Journal of Cold War Studies
Vol. 10, No. 3, Summer 2008, pp. 48–77
© 2008 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
omy, highlight the obstacles to reform of the late Soviet system. The bank’s ef-
forts foundered not only because of the Soviet economy’s dependence on raw
material exports but also, more profoundly, because of the Soviet Communist
Party’s insistence on maintaining administratively determined prices, central
planning, and tight links with the East European satellites. Those fundamen-
tal principles of the Soviet system constrained what the IIB could accomplish.
From Moscow’s perspective, abandoning these core principles would mean
abandoning the Soviet experiment altogether. In that sense, the IIB’s experi-
ence suggests that the late Soviet economic system was fundamentally not re-
formable.
In 2004 Stephen Cohen attacked the notion that the Soviet Union was
inherently unreformable, and he rightly criticized the sloppy deªnitions and
tautological thinking behind many such claims.2 But Cohen focused on poli-
tics, nationalities, and constitutional structure, not economics. As Archie
Brown countered,
While . . . some reform of the economy took place in the USSR and other com-
munist states at different times, radical reform posed fundamental problems
connected with the operational principles of the system. . . . There was a basic
tension between trying to make the existing economic system work better and re-
placing that system with an essentially market economy that would operate on dif-
ferent principles. . . . Partial reforms could and did take place, but the operating
principles of an economic system have to be, in the main, one thing or another.3
The history of the IIB, by bringing in the neglected dimension of interna-
tional political economy to the study of the Cold War and the collapse of
the Soviet Union, reinforces Brown’s point.4 Although the IIB was a well-
intentioned and thoughtful effort to enable the Soviet economy to match the
leading Western economies, it collided with structural obstacles built into the
very nature of the Soviet system. The aim of the IIB and other market-social-
ist reforms was to create a more efªcient, more effective, and more competi-
tive Soviet-bloc economy, but one still recognizable as a Soviet-style institu-
tion. To achieve that would have required abandonment of the deªning
principles of the Soviet economic system. Any Soviet regime that would have
surrendered such principles would have been so different that it could no
longer truly be called Soviet. Indeed, even Mikhail Gorbachev, the most radi-
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cal of all the leaders of the Soviet Union, never discarded the principles of ad-
ministrative pricing and central planning. To borrow the terminology of
physics and economics, the Soviet economy, and by implication the Soviet
system as a whole, exhibited local stability. Like a marble resting in a bowl,
small pushes produced only small results and a quick return to the previous
state. Similarly, the creation of the IIB had only marginal effects on the basic
workings of the Soviet economy. Larger pushes might have taken the marble
out of its stable resting place, with results impossible to foresee and perhaps
disastrous.5 A study of this Communist investment bank therefore helps us to
understand why the Soviet Union collapsed.
The Economic Context
The decision to create the IIB grew out of two separate but closely related
concerns in the late 1960s: a desire to invigorate the Soviet-bloc economies
through limited market-based reforms and greater enterprise autonomy, and a
renewed effort to promote tighter integration of the bloc’s economies. The
common thread in the economic policies of all Soviet-bloc countries by the
late 1960s was the effort to make their centrally-planned economies function
better. The condition of these economies was as yet only troubling, not the
crisis it became by the 1980s, but clear-eyed observers saw stagnant produc-
tivity, slowing growth, and administrative rigidity and inefªciency. As ideo-
logical fervor dissipated during Leonid Brezhnev’s long tenure as General Sec-
retary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the East-bloc
governments tried to demonstrate legitimacy through bureaucratic effective-
ness and concrete economic improvements.6 The attempted solutions, nota-
bly the Soviet Union’s 1965 Kosygin reforms and Hungary’s New Economic
Mechanism (approved in 1966 and implemented at the start of 1968), in-
volved some form of market socialism. While maintaining state ownership of
the means of production and some central planning, the reforms promised
greater autonomy for individual enterprises, more realistic prices, and the
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evaluation of managerial performance by sales and proªt, not merely
fulªllment of speciªed production programs.7
These internal reforms required overhauling CMEA trade. In particular,
the relatively small size of the East European economies meant that efªciency
through economies of scale required suppliers and markets beyond national
borders. The problem, however, was that market socialist reforms actually
hindered trade among the CMEA countries. Before those economic reforms
took effect, trade had been determined by bilateral agreements setting the
general scale of trade between two countries. The fulªllment of those agree-
ments, including the precise assortment of goods, was worked out at lower
levels: ministries, trusts, and individual enterprises. So long as proªt and loss
were essentially irrelevant to the evaluation of enterprise and manager perfor-
mance, this system worked well enough. Managers were rewarded administra-
tively for accepting substandard or overpriced products from CMEA suppliers
or for selling products to CMEA customers below world market price or even
below cost. Trade was essentially a matter of political will: So long as the
Soviet state was willing to maintain an incentive structure that revolved
around fulªllment of administrative directives, international trade based on
that structure could continue.
Moves toward market socialism, however, undermined the logic of
CMEA trade. Enterprise managers, increasingly judged on proªt and loss and
given more autonomy to ªnd their own suppliers and customers, had less in-
centive to purchase substandard inputs at inºated prices or to sell products
below world market prices. This was particularly true when the trade partner
was foreign and answered to a different government. Market reforms weak-
ened administrative mechanisms, posing a threat to politically-guided trade,
particularly with Soviet-bloc partners. Although the 1968 Soviet-led interven-
tion in Czechoslovakia dealt a substantial blow to the hope of ever greater
concord among the CMEA partners, the political and ideological ªssures re-
vealed by the Prague Spring made it doubly important in Moscow’s view to
promote economic integration. Even to maintain CMEA trade in the wake of
1968, let alone expand it, required active measures and Soviet initiative.
V. Issupov, a Soviet trade representative in East Germany, highlighted the es-
sential problem in 1968:
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In a country which gives enterprises and associations greater rights to determine
the production and export structure independently, it happens more and more
frequently that the obligations ªxed in state treaties and protocols for export and
import are not fulªlled because the centrally-ªxed obligations no longer corre-
spond to changed market conditions and to the material interests of the enter-
prises.8
In early 1969, two Soviet economists explained why such problems were
arising:
It is a mistake to suggest that the implementation of strict budgetary constraints
and proªt requirements [khozraschetnykh elementov] in internal reforms will au-
tomatically, in and of themselves, lead to the creation of an effective mechanism
of economic cooperation. We must not forget the qualitative difference between
internal and international mechanisms. In the ªrst instance, the broad use of
commodity-money relations and stimuli and the increased independence of sep-
arate economic units are carried out under conditions in which the state can em-
ploy the necessary levers to direct economic development along the needed
track. In the second instance such conditions are absent. . . . [A] precondition
for the progress of socialist integration must be strengthening the mechanism of
planned regulation of the process of economic cooperation.9
The question was how to reconcile the contradictory aims of market so-
cialist reforms and increased CMEA trade. Soviet economists and policy-
makers, with rare exceptions, saw supranational planning as the answer. They
held out the hope of a single plan integrating all Soviet-bloc economies, much
as national-level plans already directed the economies of the individual coun-
tries. Nikita Khrushchev had brieºy mentioned the issue in 1962, but he
quickly backed away from it.10 On 12 November 1968, shortly after the inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia, Leonid Brezhnev hinted at this new direction in a
speech to the 5th Congress of the Polish United Workers’ Party. While nod-
ding brieºy in the direction of national sovereignty and national paths to so-
cialism, Brezhnev argued that “the tasks of further development of the econo-
mies of the socialist commonwealth . . . demand that we earnestly take up the
expansion and perfection of economic ties among our countries.” He claimed
that a “broader international socialist division of labor, cooperation, and spe-
cialization of production will allow signiªcantly more effective use of social-
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ism’s advantages, the quicker development of each of our countries’ national
economies, and new successes in the economic competition with capital-
ism.”11 In themselves, Brezhnev’s remarks were unobjectionable.
Immediately after Brezhnev’s speech, however, the economist Gennadii
Sorokin described the preferred Soviet model: a single, integrated, suprana-
tional economic plan for the entire Soviet bloc. To Sorokin, an expansion of
foreign trade and greater ºexibility of prices were worthy aims but inherently
limited by small-scale, near-term thinking. Policymakers, he claimed, should
instead pursue “the gradual formation of a single structure for the world so-
cialist economy.” This “single world Communist economy with a single eco-
nomic plan” was, he argued, “an objective necessity and strategic goal.” Mere
coordination of plans was a useful step, he said, but “only a distant approach
to a single economic plan for all socialist countries.” He stressed that although
economic and political realities did not yet permit this single plan to be im-
plemented, there was no escaping the ultimate need, over the next 15–20
years, “not so much for strengthening but for a new organization for planning
in general.”12 Sorokin was well aware of the opposition his proposals would
generate in Eastern Europe. He was careful to marshal citations from East Eu-
ropean economists who agreed that more supranational integration was
needed, and he attacked those who “view integrated production as a threat to
national independence,” an idea he linked particularly with Czechoslovak and
Yugoslav economists. Both were safe targets—the Yugoslavs outside the Soviet
bloc and the Czechoslovaks now revealed as “openly revisionist.” As for the
opponents who remained within the bounds of legitimate discourse, Sorokin
attacked the idea that socialist integration could be achieved solely though
“the market or monetary-ªnancial relations,” East-bloc code for relatively free
trade. Socialist integration, he claimed, required planning, and they would be
misguided if they were to emphasize “market or monetary relations and forget
or underestimate plan coordination.”13
Other Soviet economists echoed Sorokin’s comments, establishing a clear
Soviet line on problems of economic integration—a line that emphasized cen-
tral direction and rejected free trade and semi-convertible currencies as means
to greater linkage. Ninel’ Bautina argued in 1968 that, all things being equal,
international trade in the Soviet bloc would be underdeveloped by compari-
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son to the bloc’s domestic economies. The economy within any particular
state, she said, was characterized by common ownership of the means of pro-
duction, something manifestly not the case across national borders. As a re-
sult, managing domestic trade was much simpler than coordinating interna-
tional trade. Only planning and direction could overcome this structural
obstacle, she stressed. A single planning organ coordinating all socialist econo-
mies would be welcome at some future date, but until then coordination
through multilateral agreements was the best solution. Bautina also raised, as
an implicit threat, the fundamental asymmetry of the CMEA’s political econ-
omy. The relative economic success of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East
Germany depended on subsidized raw materials and energy from the Soviet
Union. Moving to market mechanisms that would lead to higher prices for
raw material inputs, she warned, might not be as beneªcial to the Soviet Un-
ion’s satellites as they expected.14 Nikolai Inozemtsev, a member of Gosplan’s
collegium, agreed that planning was the best solution, arguing in September
1969 that the growing importance of foreign trade—reaching 30–40 percent
of national income in some CMEA countries—meant that coordination of
national plans was a necessity. In centrally-planned economies, he wrote, “the
formation of the basic direction of the economy’s development cannot be en-
trusted to the market just as the national economic plans and mutual eco-
nomic ties cannot be fully coordinated through the sphere of turnover”—that
is, through trade alone. The limited markets of the East European states re-
quired the Soviet market to serve as a means of allocating industrial produc-
tion: “The creation of a modern machine-building industry, and its further
concentration and specialization, cannot be handled in isolation in each
country.” Transnational or supranational planning was the solution. Produc-
tion, consumption, and investment grew out of rational decisions about spe-
cialization and allocation.15
The Poles were the Soviet Union’s closest allies in desiring tight economic
integration, though achieved through ªnancial and trade-centered integration
rather than supranational planning. When Brezhnev gave his speech in Po-
land in November 1968 endorsing supranational planning, the Polish leader
Wladyslaw Gomulka concurred in backing tighter integration.16 This stance
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was spurred largely by changes in Cold War politics produced by the
Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt, who sought ªrst as West German foreign minister
and then as chancellor to expand ties to the Soviet bloc. Polish fears of the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and mistrust of East Germany’s privi-
leged status vis-à-vis the FRG brought a temporary alliance of convenience
with Moscow. In March 1969, for example, a British diplomat reported that
Poles described their push for closer CMEA integration as an effort to keep
the Soviet bloc intact by preventing East Germany from moving closer to the
West. Tighter CMEA integration would also shield against FRG economic
penetration. The same Polish source in July 1969 complained bitterly about
what he described as East Germany’s desire to have the best of both worlds:
preferential access to Western markets and cheap East European raw materi-
als. Although the reaction in London was skeptical, conªrmation that such
views were circulating in Hungary as well came the next month. A British
banker signing a loan to expand Hungarian aluminum production had a can-
did discussion with a vice-president of the National Bank of Hungary. The
Hungarian reportedly displayed
a great deal of anti-German bias . . . what worries him more than anything else is
the knowledge that East and West Germany are working much more closely to-
gether than is generally realized. He asserts, for example, that an agreement has
been reached at the Ministerial level between the “two countries” the effect of
which is to include East Germany in the EEC.17
The Soviet economist Igor’ Dubinskii argued openly in 1969 that Western at-
tempts at a differentiated policy toward Eastern Europe had to be met by re-
newed efforts at integration and unity.18
The Soviet Union’s desire for supranational economic authority merely
underscored that no such authority yet existed. Although the Polish authori-
ties, too, had endorsed tighter integration, the Yugoslav government (an ob-
server in CMEA) feared supranational planning, and the Romanians were
likewise opposed to any strengthening.19 Constructive opposition also came
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from Hungary and Czechoslovakia.20 Hungarian and Czechoslovak econo-
mists generally believed that integration should be fostered through more ra-
tional pricing, a convertible CMEA currency, and a free socialist market, not
direction from Moscow. Trade would then grow from mutual beneªt. In early
1967, the Hungarian economists Sándor Ausch and Ferenc Bartha demon-
strated in great detail the economic absurdities created by the CMEA’s system
of bilateral trade deals, specifying physical units of goods to be exchanged
without any calculation of real comparative advantage. Although CMEA
trade relied on capitalist market prices as a starting point for its own pricing,
trade negotiators were primarily concerned with balancing one national bas-
ket of goods against another national basket, not about setting rational prices
for any particular import or export. The result was enormous discrepancies in
prices for identical products, creating distorted incentives for managers and
enterprises. Although broad bilateral agreement had been adequate as long as
economic management was highly centralized, market reforms had led to par-
tial decentralization and greater accountability on the part of enterprise man-
agers for proªts and losses. The conclusion Ausch and Bartha drew was that
the new arrangements “would require the creation of an essentially free
COMECON contractual price system based mainly on price agreements be-
tween ªrms.”21
Radoslav Seluckü, a Czechoslovak economist, made similar points in
1968. Reforms, he said, had decentralized economic power and created
difªculties for foreign trade, particularly a noticeable drop in the volume of
CMEA trade in 1966. The uneven pace of economic reform in CMEA coun-
tries also caused problems, with the adoption of enterprise reforms in some
countries (particularly Hungary and Czechoslovakia) that had given greater
emphasis to market forces. As a result, enterprise managers in these countries
were not interested in buying substandard products from CMEA partners or
in supplying goods below market prices. Seluckü noted that Czechoslovak
manufactured goods were more competitive than other CMEA products in
both capitalist and socialist markets, and he warned that if Czechoslovak ªrms
exported products to CMEA partners but did not ªnd imports worth pur-
chasing in return, Czechoslovak enterprises would be left without compensa-
tion.22
The solution for Seluckü was a convertible currency entailing “economic
calculations and the utilization of commodity-money relations.” He hoped
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that CMEA would “confront the question of convertibility of foreign ex-
change, which—as it seems—sooner or later arises with a greater or lesser ur-
gency in every socialist country that attempts a consistent application of [mar-
ket principles] and where the percentage share of foreign trade exceeds
20 percent of national income.” He acknowledged that “only some socialist
countries have an immediate interest in the convertibility of foreign ex-
change. . . . The countries that are economically developed, have a large
foreign trade turnover, and are attempting to create a planned market social-
ist economy have a greater interest in solving the problem of foreign exchange
convertibility than the other socialist countries.” Seluckü concluded by ask-
ing “whether the situation is not growing ripe for a fuller application of
the mechanism of supply and demand on the COMECON market,
which would better enable individual enterprises to react immediately to real
market conditions when deciding questions dealing with specialization and
cooperation.”23
CMEA already had a purportedly convertible currency: the so-called
transferable ruble (perevodnyi rubl’). Deªned at par with the Soviet ruble
(ofªcially equivalent to just under a gram of gold), the transferable ruble was
supposed to be a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value
for the CMEA economies. Unfortunately, it was not in fact truly money.
Though deªned in terms of gold, it was not actually convertible into gold. As
a unit of account, the transferable ruble suffered from the arbitrary prices in-
herent in Soviet-style economies. Without real prices, there was no way to de-
termine whether true gains from trade were possible.24 Furthermore, given the
continuing domination of central planning in Soviet-bloc economic systems
and the scarcity of high-quality products, holders of transferable rubles could
not readily use them to purchase goods, which were instead distributed ad-
ministratively. Conversely, ªrms possessing goods to sell had no desire to ex-
change those goods for useless transferable rubles devoid of purchasing power.
The transferable ruble had been designed to enable multilateral clearing,
rather than requiring each pair of countries in the CMEA to balance their
trade bilaterally with baskets of goods.25 In other words, Hungary might run a
trade surplus with Poland, which might run a trade surplus with the Soviet
Union, which might run a trade surplus with Hungary in turn. Those imbal-
ances, the idea went, could be cancelled through CMEA’s International Bank
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for Economic Cooperation (IBEC), which had been set up to facilitate the
clearing of trade denominated in transferable rubles. However, none of this
ever happened to any signiªcant degree. Countries exporting more than they
imported found themselves with a surfeit of useless transferable rubles. Loans
and credits in transferable rubles suffered from the same problem of purchas-
ing power, and so the CMEA continued to work predominantly through bi-
lateral balancing and barter.
These two competing visions of the CMEA’s future, Soviet supranational
planning versus Czechoslovak and Hungarian free trade and convertible cur-
rency, clashed at CMEA’s 23rd Session, in Moscow on 23–26 April 1969. The
session included the Communist party leaders of the CMEA countries: Todor
Zhivkov for Bulgaria, Gustáv Husák for Czechoslovakia, Walter Ulbricht for
East Germany, János Kádár for Hungary, Gomulka for Poland, Nicolae
Ceauqescu for Romania, and Brezhnev and Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin
for the Soviet Union, but they failed to achieve any clear resolution. Despite
the Soviet Union’s dominance within CMEA and despite the sobering display
of Soviet power in the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev did
not win decisive endorsement of supranational planning.26 The Soviet Union,
though by far the largest economy in CMEA, had to show a surprising
amount of deference to its smaller partners on matters of economic policy.
The session’s ofªcial communiqué stressed “socialist internationalism, com-
plete equality, respect for sovereignty and national interests, and mutual proªt
and comradely mutual aid.” Rather than designating supranational planning
as the “chief method” of achieving these principles, the East-bloc leaders
merely gave consent to “the coordination of national economic plans,” which
had in fact already been part of CMEA’s program (albeit nugatory) from the
time the organization was founded in 1949. Although the communiqué
called for “perfecting current and discovering new forms and methods of eco-
nomic cooperation,” it gave no hint of new directive institutions.27 Mikhail
Lesechko, the Soviet representative to CMEA, conceded in June that any new
organizations to promote a division of labor among the socialist countries
“cannot and will not have functions of a supranational character.”28
Without supranational planning, some other mechanism to promote
CMEA trade was necessary, and the April 1969 Moscow session created the
IIB to do this. Because a fully convertible currency for the CMEA was practi-
cally impossible, the path chosen and implemented in part through the cre-
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ation of the IIB was what Lesechko termed “intensiªcation of the role of trade
and monetary relations.”29 That could not, however, be limited to bilateral
trade agreements among the CMEA member-states. As a means of promoting
economic efªciency and international integration through ªnance and trade
rather than administrative direction, the IIB emerged as a compromise aimed
at allocating investment capital rationally and competitively and promoting
trade through industrial modernization and quality products, all without su-
pranational authority.30 The IIB was charged with investing in internationally
competitive projects that would encourage CMEA integration. Even before
the agreement to create the IIB, two Soviet economists had noted wistfully
that the nature of property in socialist economies prevented capitalist meth-
ods of investment via the purchase of real property. As an alternative, they
proposed multilateral, long-term credits.31 Vilen Karpich, a Soviet ªnancial
expert and central ªgure in later dealings with the IIB, welcomed the bank’s
creation as a necessary extension of credit relationships inside CMEA that
hitherto had been on an exclusively bilateral basis. “The extension of credits”
on a bilateral basis, he wrote, “is not always or not completely connected with
the demands of the international socialist division of labor, the development
of international specialization and cooperative production.” As East German
economist K. Wilen suggested, bilateral credits were inadequate for real coor-
dination of planning and production, which required instead multilateral
credit.32 The IIB was the answer.
The original inspiration for the bank came from Czechoslovakia. Before
the April 1969 Moscow session, Czechoslovakia’s public proposals centered
on a convertible currency and integration through trade.33 However, diplo-
matic sources reveal that a CMEA investment bank was central to Prague’s
conception of CMEA integration. In speaking with foreign observers,
Czechoslovak diplomats lauded the results of the April summit. British diplo-
mats reported on multiple occasions that their East European counterparts
pointed to Czechoslovakia as the originator of the proposal. Indeed, the
Czechoslovak foreign trade minister Ludvík Ubl remarked in wonderment
that “the Soviet Union had agreed to all the Czech proposals at the meet-
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ing.”34 Soviet leaders evidently wanted to bolster the authority of the post-
invasion regime in Prague by deferring to the Czechoslovak proposals, some-
thing paralleled by similar considerations within the Warsaw Pact.35
The communiqué from the April 1969 session noted that “agreement
was reached on . . . setting up an investment bank for the member countries
of the CMEA.”36 After further negotiations, the CMEA’s 24th session, in
Warsaw in May 1970, approved terms of an agreement establishing the IIB
along with its charter. This agreement was signed on 10 July 1970 by the So-
viet Union, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
and Poland, all of which ratiªed the agreement in short order.37 At the ªrst
meeting of the bank’s governing council in Moscow on 17–19 November
1970, the Soviet ofªcial V. A. Vorob’ev was elected the bank’s ªrst chairman
(predsedatel’), responsible for its day-to-day operations.38 The sole exception
to the Soviet bloc’s membership in the bank was Romania, signaling the later
centrality of national sovereignty and bloc politics to the IIB’s workings. The
Romanian government feared a back-door introduction of the Soviet eco-
nomic domination that it had rejected in the early 1960s. Romanian reserva-
tions did not last long, however, particularly given the safeguards for sover-
eignty built into the IIB’s charter. Romania joined the bank on 12 January
1971, less than two weeks after the IIB began operating. Cuba joined the IIB
on 24 January 1974, and Vietnam on 30 May 1977.39
The IIB’s Structure and Functions
The IIB’s ultimate authority rested in its board (Sovet), made up of one repre-
sentative from each member-country, each of whom had one vote. Major de-
cisions required unanimity and all other decisions at least a three-quarters ma-
jority. The IIB’s charter gave Moscow no more formal power than any other
member. Although the Soviet Union, in keeping with its share of CMEA
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trade, provided 39.93 percent of the IIB’s founding capital of one billion
transferable rubles (contributed in annual installments), the USSR’s economi-
cally dominant role was not matched by the formal, legal power to control the
bank. In principle, Mongolia, providing less than half of one percent of the
IIB’s capital, had an equal voice with the Soviet Union in the setting of policy
and the ability to veto major changes. The IIB proclaimed “full equality and
respect for the sovereignty of all member countries of the Bank,” and the So-
viet economic weekly Ekonomicheskaia gazeta hailed the IIB’s “principles of
equal rights, mutual proªt, and respect for national sovereignty.” As a result,
the IIB was not merely an instrument for Soviet domination, as the Roma-
nian government had feared. The charter took deliberate steps to play up the
IIB’s independent character, or at least as independent as it was possible to be
when based in Moscow with a staff answering to party discipline. Although
the IIB’s chairman was Soviet, the other personnel were international. The
bank’s founding agreement and its charter alike stressed that the IIB was
not responsible for the debts of its member countries and, more importantly,
that its member-countries were not responsible for the bank’s debts. The
IIB’s property and assets were legally inviolable, and its staff enjoyed diplo-
matic immunity. On paper, all member-countries had an equal voice in its de-
cisions. The bank was to be self-supporting, ªnancially independent, and
proªt-making.40 The system was clearly intended to refute any Romanian
complaints about possible Soviet domination.
In practice, of course, the Soviet Union’s overwhelming economic and
political weight spurred the IIB’s other members to defer to it. This deference
was already clear in the bank’s ªrst year. At the meeting of the bank’s board on
11–12 November 1971, the Soviet delegation proposed funding seven invest-
ment projects with 127.8 million transferable rubles and further evaluating an
additional four, a suggestion duly approved by the rest of the board, though
none of the IIB’s early investments went to Soviet enterprises. This unani-
mous deference to Soviet wishes was quite apparent to Soviet staffers in the
CMEA, who suggested using it more effectively. Karpich wrote to Lesechko:
It is worth noting that during the meeting, representatives of all countries ex-
pressed interest, most often unofªcially, in possible requests from the Soviet side,
emphasizing the need to begin ªnancing projects as soon as possible with bank
credits, something that would fully correspond to the bank’s missions and would
be directed at developing integration in the interests of the majority of the
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CMEA’s member countries. In connection with this, it seems worthwhile to ex-
pedite the preparation of materials from the Soviet side.41
As the IIB developed, its procedures became standardized. Actual day-to-
day management of the bank’s activities lay with its management (pravlenie),
headed by a chairman (predsedatel’) and three deputies appointed by the board
and serving ªve-year terms. Governments and state enterprises submitted
proposals to the IIB, which evaluated their export potential, technological so-
phistication, and contribution to CMEA integration. The IIB’s management,
represented by its chairman, brought selected proposals to the IIB’s board at
thrice-yearly meetings. The board then chose which projects to endorse for
ªnancing. The process was by no means a rubber stamp. At the November
1971 board meeting, for example, the management team narrowed thirty-one
requests down to twelve proposals, of which the board approved seven.42
This vetting illustrates one of the IIB’s intended purposes: to provide
market discipline in the absence of a competitive market. In capitalist sys-
tems, banks aggregate capital from individual investors and savers, pooling
funds to achieve more diversiªed and less risky returns than if they individu-
ally loaned their money to borrowers. In centrally-planned economies, with
all signiªcant capital in state hands, this aggregation is meaningless—aggrega-
tion is inherent in the system.43 What CMEA policymakers wished to achieve
was independence of decision-making, putting a premium on rational and
planned international allocation of ªnancial resources. The competitive char-
acter of the evaluation process was intended to promote efªciency, as was the
bank’s power to inspect and oversee the projects it funded.44 Enterprises and
government agencies competed for IIB loans and its scarce hard currency by
submitting, in principle, technologically sophisticated projects offering the
highest possible return on investment. The IIB itself was set up to carry out
rigorous evaluation and to reward successful applicants with large quantities
of hard currency, either provided by the member-countries as founding capi-
tal or borrowed from Western capital markets.
This effort to establish market discipline in the absence of markets ex-
tended to using interest as a conscious tool of ªscal responsibility. The IIB
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paid market interest rates in the West for its hard currency borrowing, and
any attempt by the bank to charge its own borrowers less than it was itself
paying for dollars or Deutschmarks would have been ªnancially suicidal.
Even IIB credits in transferable rubles, which were much more subject to ma-
nipulation by East-bloc governments and not under the discipline of hard-
currency interest payments to the West, could not be set at arbitrarily low
rates. CMEA economists understood that the cost of capital would necessitate
the charging of interest to enforce discipline and economic efªciency. Karpich
had argued in 1969 for the broader use of interest. He complained that the
IBEC (the counterpart to the IIB) unwisely provided trade credits that were
interest-free or at nominal rates:
Credit can exert inºuence on the fulªllment of a country’s obligations and pro-
vide for the mutual interests of debtors and creditors only in the event that the
credits are paid off with deliveries at least minimally corresponding to the level
of the possible growth from the capitalization of national income. Accordingly,
economic effectiveness dictates the need for a certain restructuring of the
[IBEC]’s credit system toward the gradual abandonment of the practice of grant-
ing interest-free credits, an appreciable increase in interest rates, and the further
differentiation [of interest rates] for credits and deposits in accordance with the
periods and types involved.45
Vasilii Garbuzov, the Soviet ªnance minister, concurred. He said that al-
though the IIB would not aim at maximizing proªts, the charging of interest
was essential “to provide for the proªtable work of the bank, the observance of
payment discipline, and payment for the resources that the bank has at-
tracted.” By 1977, the IIB was charging 3 to 5 percent interest on its transfer-
able ruble loans, a rate low enough for borrowers to afford but high enough to
provide the bank with a reasonable proªt. Nonetheless, the bank still encoun-
tered pressure to offer cheap credit for capital investment. CMEA’s less-devel-
oped members (Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam) beneªted from artiªcially low in-
terest rates for loans in transferable rubles (e.g., a Mongolian wool-processing
plant was charged only 0.5 percent). The IIB established a special fund of
subsidized credit for less-developed countries outside the CMEA.46
The IIB’s mission included supporting foreign trade both inside the
CMEA and with the outside world. In particular, the bank’s founding docu-
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ments required all loans to be justiªable in terms of efªcient use of resources.
The factories built with its loans had to achieve quality and productivity com-
mensurate with the world market, so that they would be suitable for industrial
managers under market socialism. In particular, the IIB had no authority to
invest in projects intended solely for the beneªt of a single CMEA member,
but only those of multinational signiªcance.47 CMEA commentators rou-
tinely emphasized the bank’s central role in promoting “the international divi-
sion of labor, specialization, and cooperative production.” The IIB was re-
quired to take into account general CMEA directives on the coordination of
national economic plans.48
Finally, one of the IIB’s central but unadvertised functions was to serve as
a conduit for Western capital to relatively underdeveloped CMEA members.
Although the bank did little to transfer capital from richer CMEA countries
to poorer, it did serve in its early years as an East-West go-between, providing
Western hard currency loans to the poorer members of CMEA. In effect, the
IIB concealed poor national balance sheets, so that Poland, Bulgaria, and Ro-
mania, with their relatively bad credit risks, could receive hard currency
through an intermediary. Although the bank was explicitly not a state organ
and not guaranteed, Western bankers regarded the IIB as implicitly backed
against default by the Soviet Union’s gold reserves, making the bank an attrac-
tive partner. That the Soviet Union never declared such a role, and in fact dis-
avowed it during Poland’s debt crisis in the early 1980s, had no effect on
Western bankers in the 1970s. The IIB’s pattern of lending demonstrates a
deliberate effort to improve the weaker economies while shielding them from
Western scrutiny. Hungary, the country most attractive to Western lenders,
received by far the lowest share of hard currency in its borrowing from the
IIB. As of 1973, only 13 percent of the funds Hungary received were in con-
vertible currencies. East Germany, beneªting thanks to Ostpolitik from easier
access to Western capital, received only 29 percent of its IIB loans in hard cur-
rency. By contrast, Bulgaria and Poland, probably the least attractive credit
risks, received the overwhelming majority of their credit from the IIB in con-
vertible currencies—100 percent and 76 percent respectively.49 In short, the
IIB took hard currency from the West and relayed it to the countries that
could least afford to borrow it on their own.
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By the mid-1970s, as growing debt burdens became harder to ignore, the
IIB’s member countries continued to see the bank as a way around their own
ªnancial difªculties. In February 1976 the successor to Vorob’ev as head of
the IIB, Al’bert Belichenko, traveled to Romania and Bulgaria. In Romania,
Prime Minister Manea Mänescu emphasized Romania’s desire for further
credit from the IIB but did not want the bank to seek additional capital from
its founding members. Romania was equally uninterested in borrowing West-
ern capital directly. Vasile Voloseniuc, the chair of Romania’s foreign trade
bank, complained that Poland’s macroeconomic follies made it difªcult for
other Soviet-bloc countries to borrow. The Romanians saw the IIB as a wel-
come alternative to the inhospitable Western money markets. In Bulgaria,
Belichenko met with the Communist party leader, Todor Zhivkov, and the
chair of the Bulgarian National Bank, Veselin Nikiforov, to discuss the over-
whelming weight of hard currency in the bank’s loans to Bulgaria. Nikiforov
told Belichenko that Bulgaria would not submit itself to the scrutiny of West-
ern ªnanciers, leaving that to the IIB. “In a series of cases,” Nikiforov said,
“the granting of credit [by Western banks] is contingent on receiving data
about the country’s economy and ªnances; in those cases, Bulgaria declines
the loan.”50
The Pipeline and the IIB
Although the IIB was supposed to promote industrial development, the So-
viet bloc’s technological lag limited opportunities for productive integration.
As a result, integration of the bloc’s economies depended on Soviet wealth in
natural resources, in particular natural gas. Soon after the IIB was established,
its mission shifted from industrial modernization toward fuel and raw materi-
als, a shift that accelerated dramatically in the mid-1970s with the spike in
world energy prices. As oil and natural gas became more expensive, the Soviet
Union came to act as what Philip Hanson called a “benign landlord at a time
of rapid inºation,” offering below-cost rent—cheap energy—to maintain
good relations with its satellites.51 In December 1970, even before the IIB
ofªcially began operations, Vorob’ev announced that the bank would provide
“loans for joint construction of projects in the raw material and fuel indus-
tries, thereby substantially increasing deliveries of raw materials to the bank’s
member-countries.”52 Projects to exploit natural resources were hardly the so-
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phisticated development the IIB was designed to achieve, and a group of So-
viet economists lamented that far too much intra-CMEA trade involved ex-
changes of fuel and raw materials for industrial products, boosting turnover
but not efªciency. Many Soviet economic specialists saw the IIB as an ideal
means for assembling the enormous amounts of capital needed for major in-
frastructure projects. The East European countries, unable on their own to
pay for the extraction of Soviet raw materials, could pool their resources
though the IIB instead.53 By 1977 a Soviet expert on international ªnance,
Yurii Konstantinov, declared ºatly that the IIB’s loans were directed ªrst and
foremost at “capital investments designed to achieve considerable growth in
the supplies of fuel, raw materials, and metals,” with industrial modernization
in second place. In 1980, Alexander Belovic, a Czechoslovak economist,
agreed that the order of priorities for socialist investment credit was (1) raw
materials and fuels, (2) improving technology, and (3) promoting national
specialization.54
The IIB’s commitment to natural resources at the expense of industrial
modernization took a decisive step forward in 1974. On 18–21 June 1974 the
leaders of CMEA countries met in Soªa for a festive celebration of the organi-
zation’s 25th anniversary. In between the endless speeches hailing comradely
cooperation, the assembled heads of government signed an agreement
committing the Soviet Union and its six East European allies to develop an
immense natural gas ªeld at Orenburg in the Ural Mountains.55 Simply ex-
tracting the gas from the ground and rendering it usable was a major task.
Contaminated by high levels of sulfur, the gas required French puriªcation
plants to remove the sulfur—itself a valuable industrial raw material.
The June 1974 meeting did not deal with problems of extraction. The
gas ªeld was already producing and delivering gas through local pipelines to
industrial centers in the Urals. Instead, the goal was building the mammoth
Soyuz (Union) pipeline to transport the gas from Orenburg to Eastern Eu-
rope. In an era of détente and with the Soviet bloc’s growing need for hard
currency, Soviet managers explored numerous ways of trading energy for cash.
Soviet ofªcials also were exploring pipeline deals to take gas from the Tyumen
ªeld, which dwarfed the Orenburg deposit, to Murmansk for export to West-
ern Europe or to Vladivostok for export to East Asia. In the early 1980s, simi-
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lar discussions about a gas pipeline from the Yamal peninsula on the Arctic
Ocean to Western Europe sparked bitter disputes between the United States
and its West European allies over dependence on Soviet energy.56
There is an important distinction between the Tyumen and Yamal pro-
jects and the Orenburg pipeline. The Tyumen and Yamal projects were in-
tended for Western markets, and the Soviet Union expected Western partners
to bear the burden of ªnancing them, in large part through “compensation
agreements.” Western capital and technology used for construction of the
pipelines would not be paid for with hard currency. Instead, it was to be re-
paid with the products delivered by the pipelines.57 By contrast, the Orenburg
pipeline was politically vital for tying the Soviet and East European econo-
mies together through energy dependence, but offered little economic pay-
back in hard currency. Both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were short
of dollars. Financing the Soyuz pipeline was accordingly more complex. The
IIB took over the task, publicly committing itself in February 1975 to provid-
ing the necessary funding.58
The Soyuz pipeline was a project of staggering scope. It ran 2,750 km
from Orenburg to the western Soviet border town of Uzhgorod (now
Uzhhorod, on the border between Ukraine and Slovakia). Stretching the en-
tire breadth of the European Soviet Union, the pipeline crossed the Volga,
Don, and Dnepr rivers, 160 km of swamps, and 110 km of mountainous ter-
ritory, running up a 40-degree slope in the Carpathians, at a total cost esti-
mated in the West at $1.5 billion. Although the partners initially anticipated
annual delivery of 15.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas, by the time con-
struction began engineers were aiming for an annual capacity of 28 billion cu-
bic meters. The large diameter (1,420-mm) pipeline was powered by 22 indi-
vidual compressor stations and ran at a pressure of 75 atmospheres. The entire
project, requiring an estimated 30,000 workers, was scheduled for completion
in mid- to late 1978.59
To tap Eastern European resources, the USSR’s All-Union Association for
International Gas Industry Construction, the general contractor for the proj-
ect, introduced a geographic division of labor. The 2,750-km pipeline was
split into ªve sectors from west to east, with Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland,
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Czechoslovakia, and Hungary given responsibility for the corresponding sec-
tors. Each country was supposed to provide the laborers to build the pipeline
in its assigned sector. In all cases, Soviet workers assisted with exploration, de-
sign, and excavation and operated the pipeline when it was completed. Roma-
nia, despite being a member of the consortium, took no direct role in con-
struction and instead merely provided funding and materials.
East European construction teams began to arrive by April 1975, but the
division of labor caused some friction.60 Workers were recruited through ideo-
logical campaigns and promises of higher pay, and the East German youth or-
ganization became a patron of the pipeline and urged its members to volun-
teer. But working conditions proved difªcult, and the East European workers
found their higher pay inadequate to compensate them. Several East Euro-
pean economies were already suffering from shortages of skilled labor, and
this problem was only exacerbated by the export of workers to the Soviet
Union. Governments renegotiated their deals with the Soviet Union, accept-
ing reduced deliveries of gas in return for having Soviet workers take over
large sections of the pipeline.61
On 27 September 1978 the ªnal link in the pipeline at the Czechoslovak
border was completed. The impact on energy supplies in Eastern Europe was
enormous. In Hungary alone, imports of Soviet gas were projected to increase
by 2.5 times, from 1.7 billion to 4.3 billion cubic meters annually.62
The Soyuz pipeline fundamentally altered the IIB’s mission and opera-
tions. The bank’s speciªc role in the Soyuz project was arranging necessary
credits, particularly in hard currency. The IIB handled ªnancing in transfer-
able rubles as well, easing the construction of the pipeline by setting an
artiªcially low interest rate (2 percent annually) for pipeline-related credits in
transferable rubles.63 With hard currency loans, however, no such ºexibility
was possible. The IIB borrowed from Western ªnancial markets at commer-
cial interest rates and passed on those rates to its borrowers. Although the
bank was intended to promote a broad range of investment projects, the mas-
sive Soyuz project quickly transformed the IIB into little more than a captive
source of ªnance for the pipeline. The IIB thus ended up promoting develop-
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ment through natural resource extraction, not increased efªciency or im-
proved technology. Although development and exploitation of raw materials
had been a nominal part of the IIB’s original mission, the member-states had
made little effort to include fuel and energy in the bank’s portfolio before the
1974 agreement to build the Orenburg pipeline. During the IIB’s ªrst two
years, its loans and credits were directed overwhelmingly to industry. In 1971
and 1972, 57 percent of the bank’s total lending of 279 million transferable
rubles went to machine-building, 24 percent to chemical industry, 11 percent
to light industry, and 7 percent to transportation. In 1973, large-scale invest-
ment in iron and steel altered the picture to some degree. By the end of the
bank’s third year, 43 percent of its total loans of 588 million rubles had gone
to iron and steel, 34 percent to machine-building, 11 percent to chemicals, 8
percent to light industry, and 4 percent to transportation. Fuel and energy
were conspicuous by their absence.64
The huge amounts of capital required to build the Soyuz pipeline over-
whelmed the IIB at the expense of all other types of lending. By the end of
1977, nearly 80 percent of the bank’s cumulative lending since its creation
had gone to energy and fuel, a category that did not even exist at the end of
1973. By early 1979, the IIB had funded 61 separate projects with credits to-
taling more than 3 billion transferable rubles. Only two projects from the to-
tal of 61 were in the fuel and energy industry—the Orenburg natural gas ªeld
and its pipeline—but those two projects alone accounted for 78.4 percent of
all bank lending.65
The pipeline also dramatically altered the bank’s relationship to Western
capital. Much of the IIB’s early hard-currency lending had come from Soviet-
bloc reserves, increasingly supplemented by borrowing on Western capital
markets. In 1973, for example, the IIB’s ªrst publicized borrowing on West-
ern markets had been a relatively small seven-year loan of $50 million from a
consortium headed by Britain’s National Westminster Bank and including
Bank of America and Bankers Trust.66 But to ªnance the construction of the
Orenburg pipeline, far larger amounts of Western capital began ºowing
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through the IIB. In September 1975, a consortium led by Deutsche Bank and
including U.S., Austrian, British, Canadian, Dutch, and French banks agreed
to loan $260 million to the IIB and syndicate more widely an additional $130
million in loans with a ªve-year term and a rate of 1.25 percent over the Lon-
don Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a standard benchmark. This rate, be-
ing slightly higher than Soviet-bloc banks had recently received, reºected a
worryingly high volume of East-bloc borrowing. Early the next year, the
Dresdner Bank organized an additional loan of $600 million, although in-
creasing concerns about creditworthiness boosted the interest rate to 1.6 per-
cent over LIBOR.67 In 1977 the IIB continued to scramble for ever larger
tranches of Western cash to feed the pipeline. In January 1977, Bank of
America determined that IBEC was a poor credit risk because of its unclear le-
gal status. In retaliation, the IIB syndicated its next loan in Europe through
Dresdner Bank and exclusively to European participants, barring Americans.
This loan, organized in the summer of 1977 and initially aimed at raising
$400 million, ultimately provided $500 million over 6.5 years at 1.125–1.25
percent over LIBOR. This rate was less of a premium than the IIB had paid
the previous year, but it was still substantially more than the typical spread for
West European borrowers, who generally paid less than 1 percent over
LIBOR. As an added bonus for West Germany, the bulk of the loan was allo-
cated to the purchase of German-manufactured compressor stations and
pipe.68
Although West German banks had dominated the management and syn-
dication of previous IIB loans, America’s Chase Manhattan took over in late
1977 for ªnal credits to complete the Soyuz pipeline. The IIB, in its second
major borrowing in a year, asked Chase Manhattan to arrange a $600 million
loan, and by 15 December Chase had assembled a consortium of sixty other
banks.69 That moment was the high point for Western lending to the IIB. By
later that year, as individual Western banks grew increasingly wary of ever
growing Soviet-bloc borrowing, lending to CMEA countries began to decline.
Finding participants for syndicated loans grew ever more difªcult, and those
willing to join were willing to risk less capital. In 1978 U.S. banks refused to
participate in a 10-year, $500 million loan from Dresdner Bank to the IIB.
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The spreads were quite narrow, offering little return without the sweetener of-
fered by pipeline contracts that West Germans had already won.70
This ºow of Western money proved a mixed blessing. As loans for the
Soyuz pipeline passed through the IIB’s accounts like a pig through a python,
the bank had the task of ªnding worthy new projects. In 1978 the IIB, after
having loaned more than 400 million transferable rubles a year since 1971
(mostly to the pipeline), approved only 100 million transferable rubles for
new projects.71 As Karpich explained, the September 1978 completion of the
pipeline heralded an enormous imbalance in the bank’s accounts. In 1976–
1977 the IIB had loaned 1.5 billion transferable rubles for a variety of pro-
jects. But he projected that without the pipeline’s enormous appetite for capi-
tal, lending would likely fall to just over 100 million rubles in 1979–1980. At
the 25th meeting of the IIB’s board, the country representatives expressed
their deep concern about the dearth of new projects to ªll in the gap left by
the completion of the pipeline. The IIB had been reduced to borrowing $130
million from Japanese banks merely to purchase oil for CMEA, a far cry from
the industrial retooling it had been created to carry out.72 In addition, the
steady ºow of Western credit to the IIB depended on Western conªdence that
the IIB and the CMEA in general were good credit risks. A precipitous drop
in lending undermined this belief, and Western bankers and even CMEA
members themselves could evaluate this “as evidence of the weakness of the
collective credit system of CMEA members and the transferable ruble.” West-
ern banks might even call in their loans. The weight of dollars in the IIB’s
dealings left the bank quite vulnerable to Western misgivings about its credit-
worthiness.73
The Soviet government worried about the IIB’s ability to make payments
on the hard currency it had borrowed to build the pipeline. The Soviet repre-
sentative to CMEA’s executive committee warned his East European col-
leagues about the need for prompt repayment to the IIB, and Soviet represen-
tatives to the bank itself planned to make the same point.74 The precise nature
of the problem was apparent by early 1979, when Karpich predicted immi-
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nent insolvency. The IIB’s outstanding hard currency debts totaled $2.3595
billion. Although this was less than the $2.8 billion estimated in the West, a
simple projection of repayment schedules forecast that payments to Western
creditors would outpace repayments from Soviet-bloc states every year from
1980 to 1984 by $3.0 million, $20.2 million, $75.6 million, $63.3 million,
and $67.6 million.75 To be sure, actual default was unlikely, despite the ex-
plicit disavowal in the IIB Charter of any government responsibility for the
bank’s debts, and it turned out that the Soviet Union was never tested on this
question. The short-term threat to the IIB’s solvency was resolved by 1979
with loans from British and Japanese banks totaling $850 million on substan-
tially better terms than the bank had managed previously. But that reprieve
did not redress the sharp drop in the bank’s lending.76
Structural Constraints on the IIB
The enormous volume of lending for the Soyuz pipeline and the crisis over its
completion hindered the IIB’s ostensible purpose and concealed longer-term,
structural constraints inherent in the IIB and the system it served. From the
very ªrst loans the IIB made, some structural problems were clear. Those sit-
ting in judgment over investment proposals were themselves the promoters of
investment projects, an obvious conºict of interest. The IIB’s ªrst ªve loans
for projects in Hungary and Poland came under sharp criticism from Karpich
and another Soviet ªnance expert, Vladimir Shapovalov, for falling short of
the bank’s mission to promote international integration. They had little
objection to the expansion of Hungary’s Ikarus bus plant, whose output was
predominantly (87 percent) intended for export to other Soviet-bloc coun-
tries, with clear demand already established. But the remaining projects—
electriªcation of Hungarian rail lines and the acquisition of diesel locomo-
tives, as well as Polish investment in small engines and motors—lacked the in-
ternational signiªcance and high technological level the IIB was designed to
achieve. Moreover, the bulk of the Hungarian railway loan would go to pay
the Soviet Union for 70 locomotives. This immediately presented a free-rider
problem. The Hungarian government would pay for the locomotives entirely
on credit, with no up-front commitment of Hungarian resources, and the
15.5 million transferable-ruble cost would largely exhaust Hungary’s commit-
ment to purchase Soviet goods as part of a ªve-year trade agreement. Shapov-
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alov and Karpich suspected the Hungarians of trying to get something for
nothing: buying Soviet locomotives with Soviet money and escaping further
commitments to buy Soviet goods.77 Matters did not improve as the IIB ma-
tured. In fact, when Shapovalov and Karpich reviewed the IIB’s activities after
its ªrst full year, they found continuing efforts to subvert the bank’s ostensible
purposes. Discussions with Hungarian and Polish representatives about their
projects “bore witness to the borrowers’ attempts to achieve the easiest possi-
ble conditions for receiving bank credits, putting the material responsibility
for any possible hard-currency losses on the bank. In this, the requirements of
the founding agreement and the bank’s charter are of only secondary sig-
niªcance for the borrowers.”78
The way the IIB functioned, with the member-states competing for
credit, also militated against proper vetting of proposals—the ostensible rea-
son for setting up the IIB in the ªrst place. “Countries are in competition
with one another as aspirants for bank credit,” Karpich declared. He warned
his Soviet superiors that “in a series of cases, a principled and economically-
based approach by one country to the question of extending credit to another
country was limited by the desire to provide oneself with an ally in discussion
of one’s own request—put bluntly, the principle of ‘you vote for me, and I’ll
vote for you.’” This shortcoming was evident with a Bulgarian proposal for
cigarette production. The Bulgarian National Bank had requested an IIB loan
to build a cigarette plant and expand another for an increase in total capacity
of 20,000 tons, most of which was intended for the Soviet market. But the
USSR had no plans to import additional Bulgarian cigarettes, something the
Soviet representatives neglected to mention, presumably in hopes of gaining
Bulgarian support for another proposal.79
The most difªcult issue facing the IIB, an issue inherent in the very na-
ture of the Soviet command-administrative economic system, was the useless-
ness of the transferable rubles it loaned. From early on in the bank’s opera-
tions, its management and outside observers alike saw the problem created by
loans in a currency that lacked purchasing power. The half-hearted market-
based reforms of the 1960s still left most goods distributed administratively,
not available for purchase with transferable rubles. Only if national economic
plans earmarked goods for export in return for transferable rubles was ex-
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change possible. This problem had been subtly apparent from the time the
bank opened. Yurii Konstantinov had commented in 1971 that the IIB, to
function properly would require careful integration with national economic
plans.80 Unless the bank’s loans were matched by equivalent commitments in
national plans to provide goods to match credits, the transferable ruble itself
was meaningless for immediate purchases, let alone loans.81
CMEA did try to give the transferable ruble greater purchasing power.
The ofªcial communiqué reporting on the results of CMEA’s 28th Session in
Soªa in June 1974 claimed that the member countries were devoting more at-
tention in their national plans to the resources required for integration.82 Al-
though the communiqué did not explicitly link this new integration to the
IIB, later references indicated that the meeting speciªcally directed the
CMEA members to earmark production for IIB projects.83 Later that year,
Vorob’ev observed that “the bank will compile plans for the development of
credit activity in close coordination with the national economic plans of
member nations, so that as a result of the coordination of these plans the cred-
its issued will be backed by material and technical resources. All this lends a
more purposeful character to the bank’s long-range credit planning.”84
Nevertheless, good intentions and a clear understanding of the nature of
the problem meant nothing. The lack of goods for the IIB’s loans to purchase
could have been ªxed only by adopting supranational planning or by permit-
ting real markets along with truly convertible currencies to provide purchas-
ing power across national borders. But because free markets, free prices, and
convertible currencies were all incompatible with Soviet-style economies of
the era of developed socialism, the problem of “goods coverage” (providing
products to match ostensible purchasing power) was bound to worsen over
time. The system required precise bilateral balancing of imports and exports;
otherwise, one country would accumulate goods and raw materials, while an-
other would accumulate only empty purchasing power in transferable rubles.
In March 1978 the Soviet delegation to IBEC’s governing council planned to
raise the issue of goods deliveries, arguing that “successful functioning of mul-
tilateral accounting systems is possible . . . only on condition that the Bank’s
member countries observe the principle of balancing mutual deliveries and
payments in transferable rubles.” Otherwise, creditor countries would ªnd
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themselves “with huge proªts, which are not provided with equivalent
goods.”85 Matters had not improved by 1980, when Karpich declared that
“the problem of providing IIB transferable ruble credits with goods remains
the most complicated problem in trade-accounting relationships between
countries.” He urged the Soviet representatives in CMEA to take the lead in
ensuring that purchasing power was matched by production.86 The Czecho-
slovak economist Alexander Belovic highlighted the same problem:
Experience in this ªeld [of international credit] shows that carrying out con-
struction work with credits in transferable rubles depends on prompt deliveries
of the necessary machinery, equipment, and materials. That is to say, the main
problem is the commodity content of the credits in transferable rubles that the
bank provides for investment projects to be carried out in member countries and
the supplying of machinery, technical equipment, and other requirements.87
Shifting the IIB’s operations toward transferable rubles and away from
dollars was a difªcult task that underscored the bank’s central problem, one
far more profound than a lack of investment opportunities. Most of the
CMEA members had no desire to borrow transferable rubles. In November
1979, Karpich acknowledged this point, which he attributed to “the fact that
such credits [in transferable rubles] are not really provided with goods, that is,
guaranteed planned provisions for the delivery of machinery and equipment
for approved projects with payment in transferable rubles from IIB credits.”
In 1979, Hungary, Poland, and Vietnam had requested loans totaling $171
million but had received only $91 million after painful and lengthy negotia-
tions. Poland anticipated requesting $1 billion in credits over the next ªve
years. The demand was for loans in hard currency, not transferable rubles.
Karpich lamented that “in a series of cases the country representatives have ex-
pressed only their lack of interest in receiving credits in transferable rubles.”
The worst example was Mátyás Timar of Hungary, one of the architects of the
New Economic Mechanism and president of the National Bank of Hungary,
who “refused a loan of 33 million rubles because the Hungarian request for
$38.5 million was refused.” For the Hungarians, getting nothing was prefera-
ble to getting a loan in transferable rubles.88 By 1980, as the international
debt crisis worsened, Soviet-bloc states that had been cut off from Western
capital hoped to increase their imports of goods from the Soviet Union, defer-
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ring payment and accumulating meaningless and unredeemable debts in
transferable rubles. As for the IIB, Karpich reported that Czechoslovakia, Po-
land, Romania, and Vietnam were insisting that it expand its hard-currency
lending to satisfy their increasing needs.89
Thus, after nearly a decade of the IIB’s operations, its efforts to integrate
the CMEA economies had reached an impasse. The CMEA members clam-
ored for their own investment bank to provide them with Western currency
from Western banks to purchase Western goods. By the early 1980s, the sense
of malaise was general. A remarkable position paper for ofªcial use only in
1981 surveyed the sad state of CMEA since the 1969 meeting that created the
IIB. The document noted slowing economic growth, stagnant CMEA trade,
expanding hard-currency debts, and increasing dependence on capitalist tech-
nology, all of which were acquiring a “sharper character” and being exploited
by anti-Soviet forces. Eastern Europe’s efforts to promote growth had been es-
sentially reduced to the import of subsidized Soviet energy.90
The suggested remedy comes as no surprise to anyone familiar with re-
form initiatives during the brief rule of Yurii Andropov. The “acceleration
[uskorenie] of scientiªc and technical progress” was deemed the key to success.
As for CMEA itself, the Soviet Union was willing to provide subsidized en-
ergy to facilitate industrial growth in Eastern Europe and maintain peace
within the bloc. But in return, Soviet ofªcials expected due consideration for
the common good, including an “economic conception of the international
socialist division of labor that will precisely determine the place and basic di-
rections of specialization of each member country of the CMEA, taking into
account its possibilities, general interests of the commonwealth, and the need
for effective and balanced development of the national economy.” In turn,
this goal required the restructuring of CMEA industries through “coordinated
capital investment” and better harmonization of national ªve-year plans. The
ªnal goal was what the document called a “socialist common market” in
which “goods and labor would freely circulate . . . on a planned basis.”91 In
other words, the free movement of goods and people would be achieved only
through more closely directed and centralized planning, rehashing the ideas
circulated and rejected twelve years before. The IIB, created to avoid suprana-
tional planning, had come full circle and now supposedly required suprana-
tional planning to make it work.
The IIB, then, represents in microcosm the difªculties involved in squar-
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ing the circle of Soviet economic reform. Although the IIB continued to exist
and indeed survived the fall of Communism to become a commercial enter-
prise in post-Soviet Russia, it never fulªlled its role as a key element in mod-
ernizing and revitalizing the Soviet-bloc economies. Unless the IIB and, by
implication, the Soviet Union were to admit defeat and function solely as a
conduit for Western capital, the bank’s loans in transferable rubles needed to
have purchasing power. That would have required a retreat from centralized
planning of production and distribution so that the transferable rubles could
ªnd goods to buy and the ªrms that received transferable rubles could have
used them in turn. The resolution of “goods coverage” also would have re-
quired meaningful prices so that transactions in transferable rubles reºected
real value. The CMEA countries had for years explored price harmonization,
but price differences across economies were actually increasing in the early
1980s. Even as Hungary, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria, moved toward rela-
tively free prices for some goods, the Soviet Union insisted instead on a com-
mon methodology for determining prices administratively.92 The Soviet bloc
was thus caught in a conundrum. Improved economic efªciency required dis-
mantling centralized planning and freeing prices. As Gorbachev’s reforms
would show, such steps posed the threat of total systemic collapse. More con-
cretely in the early 1980s, when Poland was embroiled in an economic and
political crisis, the abandonment of central planning and the freeing of prices
would have raised the question of what was left of the Soviet system at all, and
what concretely would link the more prosperous countries of Eastern Europe
to the Soviet Union. The experience of the IIB showed the concrete limits of
marginal reform. Real improvements in the Soviet economy required more
radical reform than was conceivable in the early 1980s. When radical reform
did become conceivable under Gorbachev, it destroyed the system it was in-
tended to save.
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